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ABSTRACT
Purpose ! We compare the deinstitutionalization of psychiatric patients
and the developmentally disabled in the United States and demonstrate
that there were two path-dependent processes with significant qualitative
and quantitative differences, ultimately leading to better outcomes for
developmentally disabled individuals.
50 Years after Deinstitutionalization: Mental Illness in Contemporary Communities
Advances in Medical Sociology, Volume 17, 27!61
Copyrightr 2016 by Emerald Group Publishing Limited

























Design ! Using secondary literature, we construct a sustained compari-
son of the two processes in terms of outcomes, timing, tempo, extent,
funding, demographic composition, and investment in community ser-
vices. We then reconstruct the strategies of de-stigmatization and fram-
ings of moral worth deployed in the two cases, analyzing their effects on
deinstitutionalization in terms of conceptions of risk, rights, and care.
Findings ! Deinstitutionalization began later for developmentally dis-
abled individuals than for psychiatric patients, and was a more gradual,
protracted process. It was not driven by fiscal conservatism, discharges,
and the trans-institutionalization of the senile aged, as was deinstitutio-
nalization for psychiatric patients, but primarily by the prevention of
institutionalization of young children, and increased investment in infra-
structure. Consequently, the deinstitutionalization of the developmentally
disabled was far more thorough and successful. The process was shaped
by the framing of the developmentally disabled as “forever children” by
parents’ organizations that demanded a balance between autonomy, pro-
tection, and the provision of care. In contrast, the deinstitutionalization
of psychiatric patients was shaped by their framing as autonomous citi-
zens temporarily suffering from “mental health problems” that could be
prevented, treated, and cured. This frame foregrounded the right to
choose (and also refuse) treatment, while undervaluing the provision
of care.
Keywords: Deinstitutionalization; mental illness; mental retardation;
developmental disability
INTRODUCTION
When researchers and commentators speak of “deinstitutionalization,”
they often have in mind the processes by which psychiatric patients1 in the
United States were moved out of institutions. Perhaps implicitly, the dein-
stitutionalization of psychiatric patients is taken as the prototype for a gen-
eric process taking place in several fields. In consequence, attitudes toward
deinstitutionalization are strongly shaped by the prevailing image of the
spectacular emptying and dismantling of mental institutions; the revolving
door of short-term admissions; the suspected prevalence of psychiatric dis-
orders among the homeless and the incarcerated; and the phenomenon of























trans-institutionalization to nursing homes, hospitals and jails. This has
contributed to an oft-repeated refrain that deinstitutionalization was a
“stunning policy failure” (Durham, 1989; Mechanic & Rochefort, 1990),
“re-institutionalization” (Bassuk & Gerson, 1978), “trans-institutionalization”
(Fakhoury & Priebe, 2007), or a “transfer of care” (Brown, 1985) largely dri-
ven by economic considerations.
We would like to push back against what we believe to be the undue
centrality of deinstitutionalization of psychiatric patients in the United
States. If we would have taken the deinstitutionalization of the develop-
mentally disabled as our prototype, we would have obtained a different
image. Deinstitutionalization in this field has been far more gradual and
deliberate, with sustained focus on creating residential and treatment
arrangements in the community. Deinstitutionalization in the United States
does not stand for a “single, unitary phenomenon” (Scull, 1984, p. 141), but
for a loose agglomeration of different processes, resembling each other, but
also diverging in fundamental respects. Researchers, commentators, and
policy-makers should account for these differences and their underlying his-
torical causes when they assess deinstitutionalization and debate
future policy.
We offer the following rationale for the comparison of the deinstitutio-
nalizations of psychiatric patients and the developmentally disabled:
(1) They were formally initiated by the same piece of legislation, namely, the
Mental Retardation Facilities and Community Mental Health Centers
Construction Act of 1963 (PL 88!164). Indeed, the struggle to deinsti-
tutionalize psychiatric patients “rode on the back” of the parallel strug-
gle to deinstitutionalize the “retarded,” as they were called at the time.
Advocates for psychiatric patients desperately sought to link the cam-
paigns so they would enjoy the “popularity and noncontroversial nat-
ure” of the far better organized and politically legitimate retardation
provisions (Grob, 1991, pp. 219!231).
(2) Because of their common origins, the policies are financed by the same
funding mechanisms, namely, Federal welfare programs such as
Medicaid, Medicare, SSI, and SSDI (Lerman, 1982, pp. xiv!xv).
(3) The populations served by the policies are not completely distinct from
one another. A sub-group among residents of State Mental Hospitals
had a dual diagnosis of mental illness and mental retardation. They
were among the most difficult to deinstitutionalize and among the last
to be moved out (Geller, Fisher, Wirth-Cauchon, & Simon, 1990). By
the same token, many of the developmentally disabled, whether in























institutions or outside, suffer from emotional and mental health pro-
blems and are prescribed psychoactive medications.
While comparisons are rare, research that does distinguish between these
groups agree that the deinstitutionalization of the developmentally disabled
has been “far less controversial” than that of psychiatric patients
(Bagenstos, 2012), and more successful in the long-run.
The main difference is residential placement or living circumstances. In
2010, 56.5% of individuals with intellectual disability were living with
family members, 8% were receiving residential support services in their
own homes, and 5.4% of individuals with intellectual disability resided in
public and private institutions (with 16+ individuals). The rest (about
30%) were in group homes and similar settings with 15 or less residents.2
People with DD/ID have never been a significant group among the home-
less (Bagenstos, 2012, p. 13). A lack of similar data for psychiatric patients
speaks volumes about the differences between the two processes of deinsti-
tutionalization. Individuals with ID/DD, even outside institutions, are still
integrated within a fairly cohesive institutional matrix of service delivery
and supervision: they are counted and followed. Individuals with psychia-
tric diagnoses (PD), on the other hand, navigate a fractured and discon-
nected “patchwork system” where the proverbial “white spots” of terra
incognita are much larger than the areas known and mapped. Few settings
have the oversight to track people with PD (Davis, Fulginiti, Kriegel, &
Brekke, 2012, p. 260) and lack of centralization makes it difficult to com-
pile aggregate data (Wong & Stanhope, 2009, p. 1378). Hence, the residen-
tial location of about 71% of individuals with serious mental illness (SMI)
is “unknown.” From a libertarian point of view, this ignorance could be
construed as a good outcome. What is known, however, is not encouraging:
13% are with family and friends, 6% are homeless, 4.4% in prisons and
jails, 2% in nursing homes, 1.8% in mental hospitals, and 1.8% are in resi-
dential care facilities. Information on the composition of specific institu-
tional settings is more enlightening: 9!20% of nursing home residents are
estimated to have SMI. Nearly, 1 million people with PD are booked into
jail every year but most are quickly released. Growth in the residential rolls
of state hospitals is due almost entirely to transfers from correctional facil-
ities. Stays at mental hospitals are short and 36% of those discharged
become homeless within 6 months. Of the more than 2 million individuals
who experience homelessness annually, roughly 25!33% have PD of some
kind (Davis et al., 2012, pp. 260!262). The homeless, in turn, are likely to
end up in a correctional facility, perpetuating a cycle in which many of the























70% whose location is unknown are likely stuck. In contrast, supportive
housing for individuals with developmental disabilities (DDs) is more spa-
tially dispersed, in less distressed, less unstable, and more secure neighbor-
hoods than for people with psychiatric diagnoses (Wong &
Stanhope, 2009).
These disparities translate to major differences in morbidity and mortal-
ity. People with SMI die, on average, 25 years earlier than the general
population (30!40% is due to suicide and injury, the rest to chronic and
acute medical conditions) (Parks, Svendsen, Singer, Foti, & Mauer, 2006).
This is true for people with SMI living “in the community” as well as in
institutions (Davis et al., 2012, p. 265). While there has been some debate
whether deinstitutionalization in California increased the rate of mortality
among DD individuals (Strauss & Kastner, 1996), the bulk of the research
has documented increases in the life expectancy of people with ID.
Improvements in medical care made a significant contribution to this
increase, but life expectancy remains shorter among institutionalized indivi-
duals with ID/DD suggesting that community living also plays a role
(Coppus, 2013, pp. 7, 13). This has contributed to an increase in the num-
ber of aging DD individuals who are at home with aging parents. We will
return to this problem later.
Research has also documented better behavioral and psychological
outcomes for individuals with DD than for individuals with PD in conse-
quence of deinstitutionalization. Overall, outcomes on a variety of beha-
vioral and psychological measures ! interaction in group activities, degree
of self-reliance, independence and exercise of choice, maladaptive behavior,
language development, self-care, and skills acquisition ! were superior in
community placements for individuals with DD (Beadle-Brown, Mansell, &
Kozma, 2007; Edgerton, 1993; Kim, Larson, & Lakin, 2001; Kozma,
Mansell, & Beadle-Brown, 2009; O’Neill, Brown, Gordon, & Schonhorn,
1985; Stancliffe & Abery, 1997; Walsh & Walsh, 1982). In comparison,
there seems to be no such consensus for people with PD. One study noted
that “participants were well aware of, and quite articulate about, several
serious drawbacks of community living,” listing the benefits of inpatient
care for the provision of basic needs even though they generally preferred
the community (Davidson, Hoge, Godleski, Rakfeldt, & Griffith, 1996).
These different outcomes are a reflection of fundamental differences
between the two processes of deinstitutionalization. As can be seen in
Fig. 1,3 the population of state mental hospitals peaked in 1955, and
began to decline precipitously from then onwards. By 1975, resident
patients at county and state mental hospitals numbered 193,436, a decline























of 65% from 1955. By 1985, they were 109,939, a decline of 81% (Davis
et al., 2012, p. 259; Mechanic & Rochefort, 1990, p. 307). The rate of
institutionalization of the developmentally disabled, on the other hand,
peaked in 1967 (at 115.72 per 100,000). In 1977, there were still 167,056
individuals with MR/DD in large state MR or Psychiatric facilities, a
reduction of 27% from 1967, and by 1986, they were 103,296, a decline
of 55% (Braddock, 1992, pp. 175!176; Prouty, Smith, & Lakin,
2001, pp. 8!9).4
More revealing than numbers of residents are patterns of admissions,
discharges, readmissions, average lengths of stay, and inpatients’ epi-
sodes. While the number of residents in state and county mental hospi-
tals in 1975 declined 65% from its peak in 1955, the number of
admissions more than doubled, from 178,003 to 376,156. The number
of total inpatient episodes declined 27% from 818,832 to 598,993 in the
same time period. From 1969 to 1982, the average length of stay
declined from 421 days to 143 days. These numbers demonstrate that
the reduction in the population of institutionalized psychiatric patients






















Fig. 1. Daily Census of State Mental Institutions: 1950!1988. Source: Mental
health data from Witkin (1989); mental retardation data from Lakin (1980) for
1950!1976 and from Braddock et al. (1990) for 1977!1988.























(composed of massive discharges, short stays, discharges, and back
again) (Mechanic & Rochefort, 1990, pp. 307!308). By comparison, the
absolute number of admissions to large state MR facilities was much
more modest, declining after 1974 from 18,075 to 6,535 in 1986 and
2,338 in 1995. The number of discharges also declined (Prouty et al.,
2001, pp. 14!15). Thus, the gradual reduction in the institutionalized
MR/DD population was achieved through the prevention of institutiona-
lization, and thus of readmissions (Landesman & Butterfield, 1987,
pp. 810!811).
Statistics about levels of funding and the creation of community
services support these contrasting patterns of deinstitutionalization. Until
the 1970s, spending on mental health dwarfed spending on MR ! likely
because the prevalence of SMI was much larger than the prevalence of
DD; in 1955 the psychiatric institutionalized population was at least four
times larger than the population of MR institutions. By 1983, spending
by state programs was roughly equal in absolute terms, and so much lar-
ger per capita for DDs (Braddock, 1992, pp. 175!176). In the following
years, expenditures on community services for individuals with DDs
increased substantially more than for individuals with PD, and in 1987
funding for DD community services was 72% higher in absolute terms
than for psychiatric community services. Half of all DD funding by state
programs was for community services, while for PD it was only a third.
The number of DD community facilities (excluding nursing homes) grew
from 4,390 in 1977, serving 62,397 residents, to 28,000 in 1988, serving
174,000 residents. The comparable development of community services
for people with PD lagged far behind (ibid. pp. 176!179). Yet states also
invested large sums in renovating MR institutions and improving the
quality of care ! during 1978!1980 almost a billion dollars was spent on
renovation and 1.2 billion was spent on improving quality of care. While
deinstitutionalization of psychiatric patients in the United States was tied
to reductions in state funding for institutions, deinstitutionalization of
individuals with DD involved increased investment in both institutions
and community alternatives, inclusive of increases specifically in States’
funding for community services from about half a Billion dollars in 1977 to
3.2 Billion in 1987! (Braddock, 1981, 1992, p. 181). So while the evidence
is overwhelming that financial incentives to states to shift the fiscal
burden to Federal programs played a crucial role in the deinstitutionali-
zation of psychiatric patients in the United States (Bassuk & Gerson,
1978; Estes & Harrington, 1981; Lerman, 1982; Mechanic & Rochefort,
1990), it would be much harder to make the same argument for























the deinstitutionalization of DD individuals, where a vast funding
increase has contributed to a 36% increase in total system capacity
(Braddock, 1999).
These numbers do not fully capture the differences in deinstitutionaliza-
tion. To put it bluntly, the prevention of institutionalization in DD was
primarily prevention of the institutionalization of children, while the massive
discharges of psychiatric patients were primarily trans-institutionalization
of the aged. The proportion of children and youth (younger than 21) in
state MR institutions peaked in 1965 at about 48.9%, declined to 35.8%
in 1977 and 12.7% in 1987, while the mean age of first admission
increased from 13.3 to 18 (Prouty, Smith, & Lakin, 2007, p. 41). At the
same time, the largest category of first admissions to mental hospitals in
1962 was individuals aged 65 or older (163.7 per 100,000), while children
under 15 were the smallest category (6 per 100,000). By 1972, the rate of
first admissions of the aged decreased sharply to 69.2 per 100,000, while
the 4 largest categories were now between the ages of 15 to 54, and the
rate of first admissions for the young (0!24) actually increased (Grob,
1991, pp. 268!269).
The destinations for these groups were vastly different. Whereas the
deinstitutionalization of adults with DD was a slow and protracted
process, underlying it was a rapid transformation in the status of children
who were kept at home rather than institutionalized. In 1987, 18.2% of
all ID out-of-home placements were children and youth (under 21),
declining to 7.6% in 1997, and to 6.2% in 2005 (Stancliffe, Lakin, &
Prouty, 2005). DD children and adults staying at home are supported by
a combination of Federal and State funds, with the latter increasing by a
factor of 6 over the 1980s (Braddock, 1992, p. 181), a fact that reduces
the significance of fiscal incentives in explaining the deinstitutionalization
of DD individuals.5 On the other hand, the number of aged psychiatric
patients in nursing homes doubled from 187,675 in 1963 to 367,586 in
1969 (Grob, 1991, pp. 268!269). In 1977, the vast majority (1.15 out of
1.7 million) of chronic psychiatric patients resided in nursing homes or
board-and-care facilities funded primarily through Medicaid. By 1985,
nursing homes housed over 600,000 people diagnosed with PD, and
Medicaid was the largest federal program funding the long-term care of
psychiatric patients (Grob, 1995, p. 54). Thirty percent of the 1.3 million
residents of nursing homes had a diagnosis of chronic MI, and 57% had
a diagnosis of chronic senility (Shadish, Lurigio, & Lewis, 1989, p. 3).
This clearly supports the fiscal explanation for the deinstitutionalization
of psychiatric patients.























Framings of Social Worth
Most existing theories of deinstitutionalization are not sensitive to the
profound differences between these two processes. Attempts to explain
differences emphasize the role of advocacy groups in the progression of
deinstitutionalization. Both Bagenstos (2012, pp. 18!19) and Braddock
(1992, pp. 176!177) cite the superior clout of “consumer advocacy
groups” such as the Association for Retarded Citizens (ARC) as an
explanation for the better outcomes in this field. They attribute this clout
not only to better organization and more experience, but also to the
extensive involvement of family members, especially parents, in these
organizations as compared to advocacy organizations for psychia-
tric patients.
With certain caveats, we agree that the role played by parents’ organiza-
tions in the deinstitutionalization of DD is a crucial variable differentiating
the two processes. Family advocacy organizations on behalf of psychiatric
patients do exist, but their impact is unlikely to have been equivalent to the
ARC and similar organizations. The first reason is timing. The National
Alliance for the Mentally Ill (NAMI) was formed by family members of
psychiatric patients in 1981, 30 years after the formation of the National
Association for Retarded Children (NARC, later renamed ARC), and
26 years after deinstitutionalization of psychiatric patients began. Before its
formation, researchers felt that families of psychiatric patients were “prob-
ably the least organized and vocal of those groups affected” by deinstitutio-
nalization (Doll, 1976, p. 386). Given this late formation, the focus of
NAMI and similar organizations was not on shaping the process of deinsti-
tutionalization, but on influencing NIMH to turn away from psychosocial
toward brain-based research.
One could argue that this difference is explained by the greater stigma of
“mental illness”; the greater legitimacy of the cause of DD; or by the singu-
larity of focus of the ARC on community solutions (Braddock, 1992,
p. 181; Grob, 1991, pp. 219!231). None of these explanations is very con-
vincing. To begin with the matter of legitimacy, the argument is that the
public saw DD children as innocent, vulnerable, and in need of help, while
the same public feared psychiatric patients, had less sympathy for them,
and blamed them for their plight. Politicians responding to NIMBY senti-
ments would not direct resources at community services for psychiatric
patients. While services for DD faced similar hurdles, they were able to gar-
ner more sympathy, partly because of the political clout of parents’ organi-
zations. If you take a freeze frame of the situation, let’s say, in the late























1980s, and you do not look too deeply, you might believe this. But the
story is more complicated.
To begin with the obvious point: most individuals with ID/DD are not
children, but adults. They are not naturally more sympathetic, less stigma-
tized, and less threatening than psychiatric patients. If we go back to the
earlier decades of the 20th century we find that the “feebleminded” and
the “insane” were similarly stigmatized, feared, and shunned. Representing
the same eugenic threat, they were placed in the same institutions. The pre-
vailing image of the feebleminded was as delinquent adolescents. Before the
1950s, there were hardly any very young children (5 years of age or under)
in state MR institutions. Superintendents rejected applications to institutio-
nalize very young children except as a last resort (Metzel, 2004,
pp. 431!433). From 1904 to 1945, more than half of first admissions to
state institutions were older children and adolescents (10!19 years of age),
typically lower-class, minority, or immigrant “morons” (i.e., slightly below
“normal” IQ). Truancy, delinquency, epilepsy, alcoholism, sexual promis-
cuity, even masturbation, served as pretexts to commitment as “mentally
deficient.” The goal of institutionalization was social defense from “defec-
tive delinquents” and “morally imbecile” youth (Malzberg, 1952; Trent,
1994). The insane may have even attracted more sympathy and less stigma
than the feebleminded, because the institutionalized insane increasingly
included the senile aged. Before the 1890s, the aged ! infirm, needy and
senile ! were typically cared for at local almshouses at the expense of
municipalities and counties. During the first decades of the 20th century,
however, local officials began to “redefine senility as a psychiatric problem”
and transferred the aged to mental institutions and state budgets: 18% of
first admissions to NYS mental hospitals in 1920 were of individuals 65
years or older; 31% in 1940; 33.3% in 1951. Growth was similar in other
states (Grob, 1977, 1995). Yet, it was mostly the case that the insane, even
the aged among them, were viewed with suspicion and fear, and were
tainted with the stain of degeneracy, poverty, and immorality (especially as
many of the aged patients were syphilitic).
Our contention, therefore, is that the difference between the deinstitutio-
nalizations of psychiatric patients and of the developmentally disabled is not
because one condition is naturally less stigmatizing, but because each pro-
cess of deinstitutionalization was continuous with a different path out of
stigma and moral taint. In each of the two spheres, a different strategy of
de-stigmatization, moral cleansing and valorization ! endowing a once
despised existence with a form of social worth ! was attempted, and while
it did not necessarily begin with the intent of deinstitutionalization, it























ultimately led to it and shaped its course. Our emphasis on the role played
by framings of social worth is not a “culturalist” or “discursive” explana-
tion. Framings of social worth are a crucial link between individuals and
the distributive mechanisms of the welfare state, understood as a complex
“economy of worth” (Boltanski & The´venot, 2006). Welfare state cate-
gories-qua-framings of social worth determine not only how much gets
distributed to whom, but also in what form, under which conditions, and
to what purpose. Thus, the comparative analysis developed below is spe-
cific to the particular “world” of Anglo-American welfare capitalism
(Esping-Andersen, 2013; Lerman, 1982).
The key to what happened in the sphere of DD is the framing of affected
individuals as “forever children” in need of guardianship, education, and
habilitation, a frame that dates back to at least 1950 and Pearl Buck’s The
Child who Never Grew Up. This frame, adopted as the explicit strategy of
NARC, must be understood in the context of the larger post-WWII inven-
tion of the child-centered family ! what others have called the “reproduc-
tive consensus” of the era (Castles, 2004, pp. 359!360; Fass, 2012; Trent,
1994, pp. 231!241). That the 1950s were the time of straight-laced, middle-
class, suburban families is of course a myth, but it was a powerful myth
operative at the time. More precisely, it was a formula for assigning social
worth (and for redistributing state resources) on the basis of “normality”:
producing and raising healthy children as an ethical goal of middle class
adulthood thereby making a “contribution” to society. Organizations of
parents of “retarded” children formed during this time (Metzel, 2004,
pp. 431!433) were mobilized to lay claim to services, but more generally to
membership in this normality. Lee Marino, one of the founders of New
Jersey’s Parents Group for Retarded Children, explained the purpose of his
organization in these terms: “parents in this era invested heavily in their
children … but, for him and others like him, the investment did not carry
the same dividends. Their families carried a special burden, one that
seemed to put normal family relations out of reach, and they wanted to do
something about it” (Jones, 2004, pp. 326!327). The term “dividends”
used here should not be understood literally. The investment in children
brought moral, not economic worth. The New Jersey parents lobbied for
entitlements on the basis of being “exceptional families,” but at the same
time they claimed recognition and moral worth on the basis of being
equivalent to “normal” families, since they too invested in their children.
This explains why parents initially lobbied for institutionalization as a
way of reclaiming normality for the family. It is well-known that doctors in
this period encouraged parents to commit their very young children to























institutions for the mentally retarded. Surveys of parents in the late 1950s
at MR clinics found that half were instructed by their doctors to institutio-
nalize their retarded child (Castles, 2004, p. 363). Doctors, especially child
psychiatrists, envisioned institutionalization as a crucial plank in a larger
surveillance system for early childhood: a system that could detect abnorm-
alities and assign children as early as possible to the right intervention ! of
which institutionalization was one possibility (Kanner, 1949; Schumacher,
1946). Consequently, there was a dramatic increase in the proportion of
very young children (0!5) institutionalized: from 6% of first admissions in
1938 to 18% in 1951, while children 0!9 years of age became the largest
group of first admissions: from 23% in 1938 to 42% in 1951
(Goldstein, 1959).
It is less well known, however, that often the parents themselves exerted
strong pressure on (sometimes reluctant) pediatricians to institutionalize
their children (Brockley, 2004, pp. 144!45; Castles, 2004, pp. 352!53,
361!63). Donald Jolly (1952, pp. 632!635), a physician in a state school
for the mentally retarded, reported that in his experience the main reason
for the large increase in the institutionalization of very young children was
the strong pressure exerted by parents. Both doctors and parents, however,
articulated the same rationale for institutionalization: no longer social
defense, but a concern for the well-being of the child and of the middle class
family. Regarding the child, Jolly explained that the positive features of
institutional life were the fact that he or she were protected from the frus-
tration of competition; that they received special training adjusted to their
needs; and that they could rely on continued care after their parents’ death.
While benefits were dependent on the commitment being voluntary, Jolly
was confident that parents eventually would see institutionalization as
“proper positive action in planning for the future of the exceptional child.”
Institutionalization also benefited overburdened parents, neglected siblings,
and marriages threatened by divorce. John and Lorraine Frank, who after
much agonizing decided to institutionalize their young daughter, explained
that they did not wish to sacrifice “the chance for a normal life for our
expected [second] child” (Quoted in Jones, 2004, pp. 326). In short, doctors
recommended institutionalization, and many parents concurred, in order to
allow families to attain the middle-class normality that was the linchpin
of the postwar social bargain (Brockley, 2004, p. 148!49; Castles, 2004,
pp. 361!63).
Hence parents’ organizations lobbied to repeal bans on the institutiona-
lization of very young children, to shorten institutional waiting lists, to
build new institutions, that is, to relieve middle-class families of the burden























of caring for their disabled children and allow them to be “normal”
(Malzberg, 1952, p. 30; Trent, 1994, pp. 236!41). The secretary of the local
chapter at New Brunswick “used her position in the group to advance the
cause of institutionalization and to urge greater support … for the state
system of institutions.” She explained that she decided to institutionalize
her own daughter “to preserve the family unit,” but that her daughter was
“still a valuable part of her family.” Indeed, the quest for normalcy did not
permit to “simply put children away and forget about them.” On the con-
trary, the parents groups included institutionalized children in “scripts of
togetherness”: there were family bus trips to the state institutions; fathers
organized a building and grounds committee to build a playground;
mothers took turns in giving haircuts to institutionalized children; there
were holiday parties and gift exchanges (Jones, 2004, pp. 331!33).
Institutionalization thus allowed the family unit to become normal not sim-
ply by removing the disabled child, but also by serving as a focal point
around which family rituals of domesticity and community rituals of civic
activism were reenacted, thereby re-including the disabled child.
This was the background for the emergence of the “forever children”
frame. Not only were there indeed many more children in state institutions
for the mentally retarded, so the frame was anchored by a certain reality,
but to cast the developmentally disabled as children accorded with the
post-war formula for assigning social worth. The middle-class parents who
formed advocacy organizations were demanding the chance to be “normal
Americans” like everybody else, which meant being able to lead a normal
family life centered on “investing” in their children, cultivating and maxi-
mizing their health and potential. It was in the name of this ideal that chil-
dren were institutionalized ! no longer to protect “society” from the
danger represented by adolescent morons, but to provide “forever chil-
dren” with a sheltering, nurturing environment that substituted as best as
possible for the middle-class family, while protecting the family itself from
the burden they represented.
The historical irony is that the very same values and energies that the
“forever children” frame first mobilized in favor of institutionalization
were ultimately a catalyst for deinstitutionalization. The aspirations for
“normality” turned into the rhetoric of “normalization.” It was against this
frame of “forever children” and the ideal of middle-class normality, that
the institution was criticized as “warehousing” and a form of social waste
(Castles, 2004; Jones, 2004). The ideal of middle-class, “normal” parenting,
and the activism to which it gave rise in NARC was not only in search of
conformity (as it is often depicted in simplistic accounts), but also in























pursuit of an ethical goal: through the activism of the parents, their child’s
existence would be valorized and transformed into a social contribution.
Pearl Buck, for example, wrote that she decided against doctors’
advice ! not to institutionalize her daughter because “I resolved
that … my child … was not to be wasted … her existence as it was and as
it is today, must be of use to human beings” (quoted in Trent, p. 231). The
same message was echoed by parent advocates such as Dale Evans Rogers
or Maria Egg. The task was to valorize this existence; to turn it from a bur-
den into something with social meaning and value. A family grows and
matures spiritually by caring for the child. In turn, this care provides a
beautiful and inspiring example to others, creating societal value (Brockley,
2004, pp. 154!156; Egg, 1964, pp. 38!40). The institution was found want-
ing not only because it failed to cultivate the child, but also because it was
secretive, a place where children were hidden away instead of becoming a
“blessing for others.” Through the “forever children” frame, the retarded
child was transformed from a destructive and disintegrative influence, into
a factor of family strength and cohesion. Her presence represented a moral
test through which the family could emerge stronger, more harmonious,
having given their existence a more beautiful and authentic shape (Egg,
1964, p. 42).
There was thus a fundamental continuity between institutionalization
and deinstitutionalization in how the “forever children” frame was mobi-
lized to assign social worth to parents, their activism and their claims
toward the state. By the same token, community treatment was not the
opposite of the drive to create a comprehensive surveillance system for
early childhood, but its continuation by other means. The main discontinu-
ity was in the role of medical expertise. While at the height of the institutio-
nalization wave, child psychiatry seemed to claim for itself the authority to
diagnose the social destiny (and hence social worth) of very young children,
deinstitutionalization, and the parent-led valorization of retarded existence
repudiated this claim, and centered early detection and early intervention
in the family, surrounded by various auxiliary agencies (Eyal et al.,
2010, pp. 91!97).
So is it the case, as Braddock (1992, p. 181) suggested that the key differ-
ence between the deinstitutionalizations of these two groups was the singu-
lar focus of parents’ organizations on community solutions? We think this
is a serious misunderstanding. In reality, these organizations were never
unified in uncompromising support for community solutions. As Gunnar
Dybwad (1961), NARC’s Executive Director from 1957 to 1963 argued,
the frame of the “forever child,” which NARC helped to disseminate, could























be detrimental to the formation of community services for its “hesitancy to
recognize the retarded as adults capable of sustained productive effort.”
We believe that what made the deinstitutionalization of DDs ultimately
more successful was neither a single-minded focus on a community
approach, nor an opposite reluctance and suspicion toward it, but this ten-
sion, this unique push-and-pull, stop-and-go process vacillating between
the two.
While NARC and other parents’ groups were among the most vocal
supporters of deinstitutionalization, initiating the process through class
action lawsuits, there were many other parents’ organizations (sometimes
the same organizations that initiated the lawsuits) that were opposed to
institution closings, or who insisted that for some children residential place-
ments were the more appropriate solution, or who wondered aloud what
would become of the “children” when their parents pass away (Egg, 1964,
p. 148; Sullivan, 1981). Bagenstos (2012, pp. 18!19) calls their opposition,
in alliance with unions of state employees, “the most significant obstacle to
further deinstitutionalization of people with DDs.” This was especially true
in States where the local ARC was itself a service provider, operating resi-
dential schools and nursing homes (Parish, 2005).
The key for explaining what happened to psychiatric patients is the
framing of insanity as “mental illness” or even “mental health problem”
continuous with less severe emotional problems and personality disorders.
Unlike the taint of degeneracy, organic and moral defect associated with
insanity, the post-war reformers depicted mental illness as something that
could happen to anybody but that could be prevented, treated, and cured
like any other illness (Grob, 1991, p. 263, 271, 303!304). This frame too is
a formula for assigning social worth and should be understood in the post-
WWII context. Earlier in the century, the British physician and eugenicist
Alfred Frank Tredgold (1908) compared “mental disorder” and “mental
deficiency”; thus, the mentally disordered were like a person in temporary
financial embarrassment while the “mentally deficient” were like the poor-
est of the poor, who never possessed a bank account. The first have tem-
porarily lost the means, the mental wherewithal, they previously possessed,
but could hope to regain it; the second never had any means; they were lit-
erally “without a mind” (“amentia”). Along with the fiscal incentives dis-
cussed earlier, this point of view explains the massive institutionalization of
the senile aged in the pre-WWII period, just as it justified the institutionali-
zation of “morons” as social defense. The economic metaphor implies that
it is worth society’s while to invest resources in the intensive treatment and
prevention of mental disorder, since the payoff ! in terms of autonomous























social contribution ! will be several multiples larger upon recovery.
Individuals who can no longer recover from their bankruptcy (because they
were “mentally decayed,” as Tredgold called the senile aged), however, or
who were never able to care for themselves, should be provided enligh-
tened custody.
This point of view became especially poignant during and after WWII
(Grob, 1991, pp. 5!23). Young psychiatrists serving in the war were
exposed to a much larger range of neuro-psychiatric disorders, presenting
in a larger population than previously recognized. Moreover, many of the
disorders were clearly the result of stress associated with combat situations.
Having proven themselves “socially capable” of societal contribution,
returning GIs were clearly deserving of treatment. They were socially
worthy on condition that they could be successfully treated and cured. De-
stigmatization and valorization, therefore, went through a different route
and a different image than in the field of DD: not the image of the “forever
child,” but the image of the self-reliant, autonomous citizen, temporarily
hobbled by stress and illness, but ultimately capable of self-control and
choice if assisted. At the heart of this frame, there was thus a paradox or
catch-22: the only way to be treated as a rational and autonomous person,
that is, not sick, is to admit that one is sick, since denying that one is sick is
the most quintessential symptom of “mental illness.” To admit that one is
sick is to aspire to become a “person with an illness,” a citizen fully pos-
sessed of the faculty of choice and the capacity for autonomy, who also
happens to have a sick body. This frame is inherently unstable as it relies
on a fictitious separation between the citizen and her body (Estroff, 1981;
Luhrmann, 2000).
Nonetheless, on the basis of this image of a continuum of “mental
health problems,” a group of elite professionals (psychiatrists and psy-
chologists) and health policy leaders (at NIMH, APA, etc.) embarked on
a campaign to modernize treatment and destigmatize mental illness, inte-
grating it more fully within a rational public health policy.6 At the heart
of the campaign was the claim that insanity was the last and most severe
stage of mental illness, initiated and perpetuated (if untreated) by a com-
bination of genetic, environmental and social factors. The instability at
the heart of the concept of “mental illness,” however, meant that the
notion of a “continuum” worked best for the reformers when the focus
was on identifying mild presentations early, among non-institutionalized
populations, and acting to remediate their environmental and social
causes. If applied to institutionalized populations, it merely led to para-
doxes and often collapsed because a claim to be healthy was also a























failure to rationally recognize illness. Thus, the reformers became cham-
pions of deinstitutionalization because institutionalization meant that
treatment came doubly too late (Grob, 1991, p. 5, 302): too late to be
effective and economic, and too late because the patient could no longer
be stably construed on the model of the autonomous citizen with a sick
body. It is understandable, therefore, why evidence emerged later that the
reforms involved a shift of focus in mental health policy from the
severely mentally ill to a more diffuse target population in the community
with milder and more episodic presentations (ibid. pp. 251!261).
Finally, this framing also meant that the connection between “care” and
“treatment” was severed. While the institution was supposed to provide
both, the focus of Community Mental Health Clinics (CMHC) was to be
on providing outpatient therapeutic services to a broad population. Their
jurisdiction did not include most of the more quotidian care needs of
recently released psychiatric patients ! residential services, supervision,
sheltered employment, etc. To put it in a nutshell: the senile aged, trans-
institutionalized to nursing homes, were provided care, but not treatment;
younger, mostly schizophrenic, patients discharged to CMHCs received
treatment, but not care (Grob, 1991, pp. 303!304, 271).
While articulating a social mission for psychiatry and seeking to mod-
ernize its outlook and practices, young elite psychiatrists had to overcome
both the resistance of older psychiatrists serving as superintendents of
mental asylums and the skepticism of many of the rank-and-file who saw
prevention as too ambitious, and a threat to their normal practice. For
this reason, the reformers built an inter-professional coalition incorporat-
ing psychologists, advocacy organizations and foundations, legislators
and their staffers and the administrative leadership of several Federal
agencies. Mental health policy became a “hinge” issue linking the profes-
sional and state “ecologies.” The “social psychiatry” articulated by the
reformers, and with it deinstitutionalization, became linked to the “lib-
eral” or “progressive” outlook that sought to shift responsibility for
health and welfare policy from states to the Federal Government (Grob,
1991, pp. 93!123).
It would be tempting to say that the continuum model “medicalized”
insanity, but this would be an oversimplification. Earlier constructions of
insanity and degeneracy were integral parts of medical science in the early
20th century, and the “continuum model” was not necessarily medical, but
relied on notions of environmental and social causation. More importantly,
the mental illness frame was (and is) inherently unstable. The psychiatric
patient with a merely medical diagnosis, the citizen with a sick body,























frequently collapses back to a morally suspect and stigmatized individual,
because the very means by which one demonstrates autonomy and self-
possession ! speech, communication, self-descriptions, reports, sureties
provided, choices made ! are suspect. Indeed, it was this very suspicion
that initially made one’s illness or complaint “mental” rather than physical
(Foucault, 2006). Consequently, morality and stigma are always around
the corner, contaminating the medical means and symbolisms that were
meant to chase them away. The individual who fails to act with self-control
and autonomy when discharged becomes morally culpable for failing to
adhere to his/her treatment schedule for reasons understood at one and the
same time as symptoms of illness and as moral faults.
We can return now to the role played by psychoactive medications in
the deinstitutionalization of psychiatric patients. To attribute deinstitutio-
nalization to their discovery is no doubt a fallacy. More precisely, it was
a story told in order to accelerate reform (Grob, 1991; Scull, 1984).
Great enthusiasm for the drugs stemmed less from their demonstrated
effects than from the fact that they fit within the rational frame of mental
illness, holding the promise of proving that insanity was nothing but
illness ! treatable, preventable, and curable ! and that psychiatric
patients were simply citizens with a sick body. Yet, for all their utility,
the side-effects of the drugs soon became contaminated with the stigma
they sought to exorcise. By the late 1960s, side-effects, namely, tardive
dyskinesia, were effectively stigmata of mental illness. Even as the
“meds” were improved and their side-effects minimized or made less visi-
ble, it was also acknowledged that they do not “cure” mental illness so
much as imperfectly control its symptoms. And if patients failed to take
their meds, was it due to willfulness or a symptom of their illness? Soon,
“taking your meds,” was a moral act, intermittently mixed with, substi-
tuted by or for, forms of substance abuse: evidence simultaneously of
mental illness and moral fault.
In what remains of this chapter, we would like to spell out the impli-
cations of these framings of social worth in terms of shaping divergent
processes of deinstitutionalization. The main difference we identified ear-
lier between the two processes was the fact that community services for
DD individuals were far more developed and much better funded than
community services for psychiatric patients, who tend to circulate
between short-term hospitalizations, incarceration, substance abuse, and
homelessness. Our argument is that this difference follows from how each
frame configures the moral worth of “care” and of being cared for. The
divergent worth of “care,” however, is itself partly dependent on whether























it is understood to impinge, or not, on the rights of the affected indivi-
duals; and on whether it is understood to be necessary in order to protect
vulnerable individuals from risk, or on the contrary to protect others
from the threat they pose. Hence, we organize the discussion below
beginning with how each frame configures who is risky and to whom,
proceeding to how it construes the rights of disabled individuals, and
finally ending with the moral worth of “care” within each frame.
Risk
To put it simply from the outset: the frame of “forever children” fore-
grounded the risks that the community environment posed to the DD. In
comparison, the frame of “mental health problems” minimized both the
risk to psychiatric patients and the risk they posed to others, presenting
deinstitutionalization as safe. Yet, it also led to other processes that accen-
tuated perceptions of the risk psychiatric patients posed to others.
The institution embodied this tension between risk and protection.
(Fakhoury & Priebe, 2007). Earlier in the 19th century, residential schools
for the feebleminded and asylums for the insane were justified as providing
protective custody for individuals who could not fend for themselves.
Later, during the first decades of the 20th century, the justification shifted
to focus on the risks that the insane or the feebleminded posed to society.
The theory of degeneration cast both as representing a eugenic threat to
the long-term viability of the (white) race, while theories of social defense
attributed to them a disproportionate share of crime, sexual promiscuity,
idleness, poverty, etc.
This tension between risk and protection has resolved itself in two ways.
To begin with psychiatric patients, the frame of “mental health problems”
de-emphasized their need for protection as well as the risk they posed to
others. Yet, the separation of “treatment” from “care” ultimately led to
increased worries about the risk they represented to the communities
into which they were discharged. As we saw earlier, deinstitutionalization
involved a massive trans-institutionalization of the aged in need of care to
nursing homes. Individuals with both DD and organic (as opposed to func-
tional) illnesses were also discharged to nursing homes and ICF-MRs. In
short, those most obviously in need of protection were trans-institutionalized
to various care facilities. By the same token, the bulk of those who were
discharged to be treated in CMHCs were individuals more likely to be
perceived as posing some level of risk to those around them: young























schizophrenics and what came to be known as “borderline personality dis-
order.” Moreover, the first generation of psychiatric patients to reach
adulthood in the community was baby boomers. Like their “normal” age
peers they questioned authority and experimented with new life styles.
Consequently, they were characterized by higher levels of substance abuse
and homelessness, aggressiveness, and noncompliance (Geller et al., 1990;
Grob, 1995).
As a result, commentators have paid a great deal of attention to the
risky behaviors of former psychiatric patients and to the risks they posed
to others. While some researchers pointed out that those who pose a risk to
society were a minority and that most should be understood as vulnerable
(Allen & Nairn, 1997; Laws & Dear, 1988), many researchers and commen-
tators, highlighted the overlap between psychiatric diagnosis, homelessness,
substance abuse, and crime which served as strong evidence of the failure
of community-based care (Durham, 1989; Steadman, Monahan, Duffee, &
Hartstone, 1984).
The opposite is true of the DD. Given their framing as “forever children,”
the focus of advocates, lawmakers, service providers, and especially of par-
ents’ organizations was on risks they faced outside the institution. Under the
Willowbrook consent decree, for example, residents were not released until
there was an adequate residential alternative available. In fact, precisely
because of the previous experience with the deinstitutionalization of psychia-
tric patients, reformers were concerned that the state would attempt to sim-
ply “dump” Willowbrook residents, which it tried to do before the consent
decree was signed. After it was signed, the court-appointed review panel had
to overcome the resistance of parents’ organizations, who preferred trans-
institutionalization to borough “developmental centers.” Throughout the
process, the governing language was one of concerns to prevent “harm.”
Similar precautions were taken during the mandated deinstitutionalization
of Pennhurst and other institutions. Reformers articulated a theory accord-
ing to which institutional environments caused “intellectual, social, and emo-
tional harms,” while parents emphasized the potential for harm outside a
protective environment (Carey, 2009; Rothman & Rothman, 2005, pp. 70,
90!93, 102!103, 106!111, 127!141, 151!174, 200). The most poignant
commentary and critique came from Voice of the Retarded (VOR), a par-
ents’ group. They drew on the “forever children” frame to accentuate the
risks to the DD, and to ridicule the discourse of “rights.” VOR quipped that
the insistence on the civil rights and freedom of choice of the DD would
merely become “the rights of people with DDs to eat too many doughnuts
and take a nap” (Bannerman, Sheldon, Sherman, & Harchik, 1990). If























the DD needed rights at all, said VOR activists, it was a “right to be
retarded,” namely, a right not to be placed at risk because of a misguided
insistence on autonomy (Bagenstos, 2012).
The leadership of NARC, on the other hand, while firmly in favor of
deinstitutionalization, searched for the right balance between protection
and autonomy, the right level of “acceptable risk.” Perske (1972) argued
that protecting the disabled person from all types of risk limited their
access to a “normal life” and violated the main principle of normalization
theory ! “letting the mentally retarded obtain an existence as close to the
normal as possible.” A certain level of risk was normal and endowed those
exposed to it with social worth, what Perske called the “dignity of risk.”
Ultimately, the 1975 Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of
Rights Act reflected this balanced stance on risk in their mandated selective
deinstitutionalization of developmentally disabled individuals “who have
been prepared through programs of habilitation and training to function
adequately in appropriate local settings” (Landesman & Butterfield, 1987,
pp. 810!811). While there was fierce debate among parent activists and
advocates about how to balance risk, there did not seem to be similar levels
of worry about the risk that DD individuals posed to others.
These differentials focus on risk no doubt shaped decisions about the
location of residences for psychiatric patients and DD individuals. While
survey research found that citizens were in theory supportive of having
both psychiatric patients and DD individuals live in the community
(Gallup, 1976; Gottwald, 1970), the actual placement of community resi-
dences in neighborhoods typically led to protests based on the anticipated
impact on property values, safety, and health risks to the community
(Kastner, Reppucci, & Pezzoli, 1979; Piat, 2000). Once DD individuals
actually moved into a neighborhood and became a regular presence, the
opposition typically subsided. Concerns about the risk psychiatric patients
posed remained more entrenched (Lubin, Schwartz, Zigman, & Janicki,
1982). Moreover, concern about risks posed to the developmentally dis-
abled by community placement dictated a great deal of care in choosing
“safe” community settings for permanent residences while psychiatric
patients tended to be pushed toward dilapidated urban areas, welfare
hotels, and similar temporary residences that house also former convicts,
people in substance abuse programs, etc. ( Wong & Stanhope, 2009). This
has reinforced the perception of psychiatric patients as “risky,” and con-
tributed to a vicious cycle in which various forms of confinement and
“secure accommodations” become a preferred residential placement for
“mentally disordered offenders” (Moon, 2000).
























In both fields, deinstitutionalization was driven in large part by concern for
the civil rights of inmates (Accordino, Porter, & Morse, 2001; Estes &
Harrington, 1981). Exposes of abuse, maltreatment, and coercion at institu-
tions highlighted that people were being held against their will without
treatment or care (Kugel & Wolfensberger, 1969; Blatt & Kaplan, 1974).
Legal activists, reformers, and civil libertarians, inspired by the larger
civil rights movement of the 1960s, drew on these reports to launch a
wide-ranging legal attack on institutions (Mechanic & Rochefort, 1990).
Despite similarities, there were also important and telltale differences
in the legal argumentation and rhetoric of rights deployed in the two
fields. Bagenstos (2012) introduces a useful distinction between two lines
of due process doctrine used in early litigation. One was an argument for
“negative rights”: a “right against treatment” which targeted involuntary
commitment (and involuntary medication) and attempted to impose pro-
cedural limitations so individuals could not be held against their will
unless they were dangerous to themselves or others. This strategy was
prominent in litigation regarding psychiatric patients. It was articulated
by civil libertarian lawyers, who saw “institutionalization as an end run
around the criminal procedure revolution” (Bagenstos, 2012, pp. 24!25).
For this reason, they were highly suspicious of the expert opinion of
professionals and sought to limit the authority psychiatrists exercised as
public health officials. Autonomous citizens are not compelled to be trea-
ted; they choose whether to follow a doctor’s advice regarding course of
treatment. Hence, the rights of psychiatric patients were framed as civil
rights: the right to choice and the right to be free from coercion. Denied
in the institution, movement to the community was the only way to
restore them. While this reasoning leads naturally to closing institutions
and fairly rapidly moving individuals into the community, it is silent
about how individuals should be assisted to cope and thrive in the
community7 (Bagenstos, 2012, p. 15, n. 61).
The other litigation strategy articulated a positive “right to treatment”.8
This strategy did not target involuntary commitment but the substantive
quid pro quo underlying it: if you confine somebody with the justification of
providing treatment, then you must indeed provide treatment that aligns
with professional standards: “only the fulfillment of the therapeutic pro-
mise in fact can justify the deprivation of fundamental human liberties”
(Schwitzgebel, 1973, p. 535). Moreover, treatment must provide “minimally
adequate habilitation” and should “be designed to promote the acquisition























of skills necessary to live outside of an institution.” This strategy was far
more effective than the “right against treatment.” DD claimants and their
families were able to win compensation for harm because of failure to pro-
vide habilitation (Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hospital). There
are three points we would like to make about this strategy: first, note that
its implications are more ambiguous than the “right against treatment.” It
could be used either to close institutions or to improve them. Unlike the
“right against treatment,” the right to treatment cannot be interpreted as
providing license to disinvest in services ! institutional or
community ! for the DD. Second, instead of sidelining expert opinion as
the right against treatment does, what qualifies as “minimally adequate
habilitation” depends on “accepted professional judgment, practice, or
standards” (Bagenstos, 2012, pp. 25!26), around which legal activists,
patients, parents, and professionals can form an enduring coalition.
Finally, whereas the world conjured by the right against treatment is
binary, the terms in which the right to treatment are phrased construct a
continuum between the institution and the community. The key develop-
ment was the switch to a “right to habilitation.” Early commentary pointed
out that the right to treatment was phrased in medical terms that were irre-
levant and unrealistic for DD individuals because they assumed cure as an
end goal. Habilitation, on the other hand, would assist the DD individual
in acquiring and maintaining skills to cope with the demands of life in the
community (Mason, Menolascino, & Galvin, 1976). This right to habilita-
tion was further expanded by Welsch v. Likins, which established the right
to habilitation in the Least Restrictive Environment (LRE), incorporating
the right against treatment in a less destructive way. Not only was it possi-
ble to sue institutions because they did not provide adequate habilitation, it
was also possible to sue them if ! according to professional opinion ! the
same habilitation could be provided in a more “normal” setting (Horacek
v. Exon). Unlike “cure” or “recovery,” “habilitation” ! namely, “making
able” ! is potentially never-ending and consonant with the “forever chil-
dren” frame. We educate and train children so they acquire self-care skills,
extending their sphere of autonomy slowly and cautiously, with an adult
always close by. “Making able” to live and work outside the institution
would happen through supportive services that mirrored this care of chil-
dren. This is poignantly captured in the concept of the “prosthetic environ-
ment” coined by the Director of the Eden School for Autistic Children
(Holmes, 1990), which indicates that between protective custody and full-
fledged autonomy stretches a whole range of hybrid and ambivalent
arrangements: “supports” in the double sense of protecting incomplete























beings (the developmentally disabled-as-children) and making them able,
allowing them to develop.
These litigation strategies had a profound impact on the process of dein-
stitutionalization. The greater emphasis on due process and the right of
psychiatric patients to refuse treatment reinforced the distinction between
treatment and care and created a binary opposition between coerced insti-
tutionalization and voluntary community treatment. It thus inhibited the
development of hybrid services that ! because they focus on care and con-
tinuous habilitation ! appear paternalistic. Additionally, many hospitals
were cautious about admitting people with psychiatric diagnosis lest they
be accused of violating the rights of patients who may not be able to fully
consent to commitment (Mason et al., 1976; Teplin, 1984).
In contrast, emphasis on positive rights to habilitation for DD indivi-
duals required attention to support services in the community as part of
providing adequate care into and through adulthood. To habilitate the
developmentally disabled is not to “cure” them, restoring a sanity or nor-
malcy they once possessed, but is to move along an ascending gradient of
acquiring new skills and abilities through therapies that are often much clo-
ser to training and education than to medical treatment. Pressing for the
right of the developmentally disabled for “minimally adequate habilitation”
was to press for arrangements that combined treatment, care, and every-
thing in between.
Litigation in the name of a right to habilitation, in which positive and
negative rights clashed, acted as a brake on deinstitutionalization for the
developmentally disabled (Carey, 2009). For psychiatric patients, the strong
emphasis on negative rights emptied positive rights of their content. By the
same token, for the developmentally disabled, the pursuit of positive rights
often limited and even completely eliminated negative rights. If adequate
habilitation could not be provided in the community with family, DD
adults were kept in the institution until an appropriate placement was
available (Rothman & Rothman, 2005). The very same advocates who liti-
gated in the name of a right to habilitation, would sometimes contest the
extension of civil rights for the developmentally disabled (Landesman &
Butterfield, 1987). For example, while parents fought for the right to habili-
tation for their children, they also fought for guardianship rights and in
some cases, for the right to keep their child in the institution (Rothman &
Rothman, 2005). Normalization theory could be understood as an (only
partly successful) attempt to mediate this tension, since it implies that lim-
itations on negative rights could also be injurious to the positive right to
habilitation, while the closest possible approximation to full civil rights has























therapeutic value. This middle-way argument never satisfied all the sides in
the debate, yet was able to facilitate the formation of workable coalitions
in favor of a “continuum of care.”
Care
As we saw earlier, the framing of psychiatric patients as autonomous citi-
zens temporarily hobbled by “mental health problems” meant that their
deinstitutionalization led to a separation between “treatment” and “care”
(Grob, 1991). The senile aged, those with complex disabilities, or those
who required follow-up after hospitalization, were transferred to nursing
homes, where they received care, but little by way of treatment. The rela-
tively younger schizophrenics, who were discharged into the “community,”
received only treatment, but no care (Scull, 1984; Bachrach, 1976;
Bassuk & Gerson, 1978). This model worked for some, if their problems
were not too severe; if their illness was episodic; and if they had medical
insurance, since Federal funding for the CMHCs dried up over time (Davis
et al., 2012). For the large group of poor, chronic, severely disabled, how-
ever, this model proved a vicious circle. Condemned to a precarious and
stigmatized existence, they are perceived as complicit in their own situation
(on account of their right to refuse treatment and because of high rates of
substance abuse, incarceration, and welfare dependence) and as a public
nuisance (because of high rates of homelessness, poverty, and unemploy-
ment). This has resulted in less public support for comprehensive care, and
the segregation of individuals in areas where the care infrastructure is non-
existent (Durham, 1989; Grob, 1995).
Care without treatment; treatment without care; this seems to be the fate
of psychiatric patients; their Scylla and Charybdis. Yet, the comparison
with the deinstitutionalization of DD demonstrates that this predicament is
historically contingent.
One could object and say that the real difference lies in the fact that
unlike psychiatric patients, DD individuals discharged from institutions
often had family homes waiting for them (Braddock, Emerson, Felce, &
Stancliffe, 2001). This is partly true. In many cases, the families of psychia-
tric patients did not assume responsibility for their discharged kin. In con-
trast, as we saw, the deinstitutionalization of DD individuals began with
parents who took the public stance of keeping their children home, while
the first to be discharged from institutions were typically children and
younger adults who were reabsorbed at home (Best-Sigford, Bruininks,























Lakin, K.C., Hill & Heal, 1982). Contemporary research on mentally ill
and developmentally disabled living at home has shown that parents of the
developmentally disabled report more satisfaction social support in doing
so, even into old age (Seltzer, Greenberg, Krauss, & Hong, 1997). Indeed,
the problem of DD individuals living at home with aging parents has
become a serious policy concern. In 2010, 56.5% of individuals with intel-
lectual disability were living with family members at home (RISP, 2010).
About a quarter and perhaps more were living with family members over 60
years old. This phenomenon of aging parents with continuing caregiving
responsibilities for their disabled children has been attributed to an increased
lifespan for the disabled, the consequences of deinstitutionalization, and a
shortage of residential options for adults with DDs (Braddock, 1999; Eyman &
Borthwick-Duffy, 1994; Lefley, 1987). While psychiatric patients certainly
face similar barriers to securing services and moving out of the family home,
it is striking that both families and government programs assume that the
housing needs of the developmentally disabled should be explicitly planned
for and that families should take a leading role.
Ultimately, however, the differences in how care is conceived and orga-
nized are not simply a function of DD individuals being absorbed at home,
while psychiatric patients are not, but of the framing of developmentally
disabled individuals as “forever children,” where treatment is construed as
habilitation and modeled upon the care and cultivation that the “normal”
family provides. In this frame, treatment-qua-habilitation and care are not
easily distinguished, and certainly not easily separated. Courts interpreted
the right to habilitation as a requirement that States develop comprehen-
sive community-based services, because the developmentally disabled were
perceived as in need of care. At the same time, there was an effort to bal-
ance this need for care with the presumed therapeutic effects of genuine
(even if somewhat risky) integration. When it became clear that the mere
location of services in the community did not guarantee integration (e.g.,
the continued segregation of special education within public schools, or the
fact that many group homes did not provide community experiences), the
1984 Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act rede-
fined community integration as residence in proximity to community
resources, in home-like settings, regular contacts with non-handicapped,
use of all community resources and participation in all community activ-
ities. The legislation was guided by the ideal of a “continuum of care,” a
continuum of residential settings and services with varying combinations
and levels of care and treatment, protection and integration, supervision
and autonomy (Wolfensberger & Nirje, 1972).























We can state the difference between how “care” is configured by the
two processes of deinstitutionalization in the terms we suggested earlier.
The strategy by which reformers and advocates sought to endow stigma-
tized psychiatric patients with social worth belongs to an economy of
worth (Boltanski & The´venot, 2006), in which “care” stands for lack of
worth. Those who are cared for are unworthy beings because they are
not autonomous. They are “dependent” and consequently their capacity
to exercise “control, command, choices, self-determination … aspects of
competent selfhood in our society” is diminished even in the framework
of community treatment (Estroff, 1981, p. 175). The charge of the refor-
mers against mental hospitals was that they “promote weakness and
dependency … Patients become unable to trust their own judgement,
become indecisive, overly submissive to authority, frightened of the out-
side world” (Chamberlin, 1978, p. 6). As these patients moved outside
institutions, the opposition between care and autonomy remained.
CMHC clients were strongly discouraged by the staff from receiving any-
thing from their parents, since this would reinforce their dependency,
their unworthy status as semi-“minors.” (Estroff, 1981, p. 161). The
similarity to the critique of “welfare dependency” is not accidental. The
point is not that deinstitutionalization was motivated by libertarian or
neo-conservative ideology (though there were definitely significant influ-
ences between the two), but that both were articulated within the same
economy of worth, within the same “world” of Anglo-American welfare
capitalism, where redistribution takes place through the stigmatizing
mechanism of means-testing and is understood as “assistance” or “relief”
(Esping-Andersen, 2013; Lerman, 1982). The characteristic catch-22 of
this world applies in this case as well: if you are worthy (i.e., working or
sane), you do not need assistance or care; if you need assistance or care
(you are poor, unemployed, insane, homeless), you are unworthy, because
you are no longer autonomous, and therefore you are only deserving of
paltry assistance (e.g., SSI, sheltered employment), which will be immedi-
ately withdrawn if you attempt to regain your worth (by working, by
being discharged) ! unless this assistance could be construed strictly on
the model of “medical treatment” (e.g., “meds,” preferably self-adminis-
tered and self-monitored) (Estroff, 1981, pp. 169!173). By the same
token, moreover, those who care for dependents are also liable to be seen
as unworthy to the extent that they are perceived as illegitimately
encroaching upon the autonomy of others. The accusation of “tyranny”
has been leveled at institutions’ staff, CMHC’s staff, board-and-care
homes’ operators, group homes’ attendants, and welfare bureaucrats.























What from one side appears as the necessary supervision and guardian-
ship involved in providing care, appears from the other side as tyranny
and “social control.”
The strategy by which parents and advocates sought to endow stigma-
tized DD individuals with social worth belongs to a completely different
economy of worth, wherein “care” transmits and augments worth. Those
who care for weaker beings are worthy because they contribute to a greater
good ! whether this good is understood in the secular frame of societal
well-being and cohesion, or in the religious frame of caritas. NARC parents
were told that “a fine and beautiful mission awaits you, [because] the cross
we bear can become a blessing for others” (Egg, 1964, pp. 38!42). Those
who are cared for are valorized because their lives, their struggles, their
experiences, and the very care they received become a moral example ! in
Pearl Buck’s words, “of use to human beings.” In NARC literature, as well
as in on-line postings of parents of autistic children (Fleischmann, 2005),
disabled children are depicted as “teachers” from whom their parents, the
whole family, or even others learn the true meaning of life, or discover
powers and abilities they did not know they possess. This economy of
worth developed, as we have argued, on the basis of the “reproductive con-
sensus” of the postwar years and by framing the developmentally disabled
as children.
CONCLUSIONS
We have demonstrated that the processes of deinstitutionalization of psy-
chiatric patients and of DD individuals have unfolded in drastically differ-
ent ways depending on framings of social worth and strategies of
destigmatization. While it is indisputable that financial incentives played a
crucial role in shaping the deinstitutionalization of psychiatric patients,
they did not have the same effect in the case of DD individuals, where the
framing was different. This contrast allows us to see that the framing of
psychiatric patients as autonomous individuals temporarily suffering from
“mental health problems” served as a precondition for the alignment of
interests between advocates, experts, and fiscal conservatives.
Deinstitutionalization was fought on the basis of the right to decline treat-
ment, and an opposition between autonomy and care. It led to a process
that was swift and concentrated on discharging patients, rather than arran-
ging for care in the community. The deinstitutionalization of psychiatric























patients is largely considered a failure because of this lack of supportive
services in the community and because it has created a system in which psy-
chiatric patients are moved through a “revolving door” of incomprehen-
sive services.
Deinstitutionalization of DD individuals, on the other hand, has been
considered a qualified success because alongside gradual and careful dis-
charges it involved also significant investment in and the concurrent
development of community-based services. The framing of DD indivi-
duals as “forever children,” however paternalistic, meant that deinstitu-
tionalization was fought on the basis of a right to habilitation, which
did not oppose care to autonomy or separate it from treatment. It also
meant that the alignment of interests behind deinstitutionalization was
only partial, and the process was characterized by a constant push-and-
pull which made it far more gradual. This has laid the groundwork for
the creation of a continuum of both institution-based and community
services at varying levels of support. We believe that this expanded pic-
ture of deinstitutionalization should inform discussion of civil rights,
entitlements, and responsibilities as we continue to develop community-
based services for both psychiatric patients and the developmen-
tally disabled.
NOTES
1. We use the terms “psychiatric patients” and “developmentally disabled” to
refer to the broadest possible groups of individuals who would have been institu-
tionalized in the past on the basis of a diagnosis respectively of “mental illness”
or “mental retardation” (MR). The 1969 legislation that created the category of
“developmental disability” (DD) included three groups ! those diagnosed with
mental retardation, epilepsy and/or cerebral palsy. In 1977, autism was added.
We occasionally use the terms “insanity”, “mental illness,” “mental retardation”
or “feeblemindedness” when it is historically accurate to do so, namely when we
need to refer to the categories and terminology used by people at the time that
we are discussing. Finally, we use the term “intellectual disability” (ID) to refer
specifically to individuals who currently are diagnosed with such disability on the
basis of a lower score on an IQ test, and who are counted as such in offi-
cial statistics.
2. Figures are based on the data collected by the National Residential
Information Systems Project (RISP, 2010) at the Research and Training Center on
Community Living at the University of Minnesota. http://rtc3.umn.edu/risp/build/
index.asp (Last accessed 5.20.2015).
3. Taken from Braddock (1992)























4. An additional illustration of the differences between the two processes of dein-
stitutionalization could be provided by comparing the numbers of individuals with
MR diagnosis in state MR and psychiatric facilities. The bulk of residents with MR
diagnosis were housed in state MR facilities and the trend there tracks closely the
numbers presented above. Some, however, were housed in state psychiatric facilities,
i.e. together with psychiatric patients, and were discharged earlier and faster than
those in state MR facilities. The number of individuals with MR diagnosis at state
psychiatric facilities peaked in 1960, and declined rather quickly to 15,524 in 1977, a
59% decrease from the peak. By 1986 there were only 3,106, a 91% decrease. The
corresponding decreases for individuals with in state MR facilities were 22% and
49% respectively (Prouty et al., 2001, pp. 8!9). It is quite possible that many of the
individuals who resided in state psychiatric facilities were transferred to state
MR facilities.
5. An important caveat is that there was huge variation between states in levels
of funding (Braddock, 1992, p. 178), suggesting that the fiscal explanation is
perhaps more valid in some states, but much less so in others. We would expect,
however, that states with low levels of funding for community services also had
lower levels of funding for institutions and a lower rate of institutionalization in
the past. On state differences in rates of institutionalization, and their relation-
ship to deinstitutionalization, see Eyal, Hart, Onculer, Oren, and Rossi (2010,
pp. 64!67)
6. Grob’s otherwise excellent and thorough account ignores, however, another
source of this focus on prevention and understanding of mental illness as caused by
early emotional problems, namely, the mental hygiene and child guidance move-
ments. While child guidance began with a focus on “saving” immigrant and lower-
class children from the risk of delinquency, by the time of WWII it was thoroughly
focused on early identification of emotional problems before they turned into adult
forms of mental illness. (Kanner 1941/1964, pp. 171!172; Nadesan, 2005,
pp. 44!45, 58!73; Nehring, 2004, pp. 371!372)
7. Incidentally, this suggests that Scull’s claim that deinstitutionalization consti-
tuted a single, unified phenomenon is better understood not as an explanation or
hypothesis that could be verified or refuted, but as an “account” in the ethnometho-
dological sense, a narrative articulated by some of the key actors, namely civil liber-
tarian lawyers. From their point of view there was a formal analogy between
commitment procedures in all the distinct spheres of “social control”. Their litiga-
tion strategy was based on an analogy between commitment and “arrest”. Whether
deinstitutionalization was a unified phenomenon or not depends on whether they
managed to prevail, and whether this account could translate the interests of all the
other parties involved and could hold the deinstitutionalization coalition together.
As already indicated above, clearly it could not do so in the field of developmental
disabilities.
8. Rothman and Rothman (2005, pp. 87!88, 106!111), however, explain that
since the “right to treatment” was not accepted by the judge presiding over the
Willowbrook case, the reformers’ strategy was to extend “the right of protection
from harm…until it was the equivalent of a right to treatment.” Tellingly, this was
done through an analogy to children’s right to education ! without which they are
harmed because their development is stymied.
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